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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARION 0. WRIGHT, 
Plaintiff and Res(J)on.dent, 
-vs.-
THERON W. MAYNARD, 
DefendanJt and AppelZant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7566 
Defendant at page 2 of his brief sets forth his 
"alleged" Statement of Fact. However, it is. obvious 
that defendant has employed the wrong nomenclature 
and intends his misleading statements to be argument. 
The facts of the case are as follows : 
Plaintiff, Marion 0. Wright, resided near the north-
erly outskirts but within the corporate limits of the City 
of Orem. (Tr. 106). His home was on the east side of 
Highway 91, north of a slight bend in Highway 91. High-
way 91 was at that time a two-lane highway. (Tr. 7, 
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45, 80, 107). Immediately north 'Of plaintiff's home was 
a garage owned and operated by plaintiff and referred 
to in the record as Wright's Garage. (Tr. 4, 106). Two 
separate driveways lead from Highway 91 easterly. One 
of the driveways leads to Mr. Wright's home, the other 
driveway leads into the garage. (Tr. 107-108). The exact 
distance between driveways does not appear in the 
record. The distance between Wright's Garage and the 
curve to the south was variously estimated by the wit-
nesses at from 250 to 400 feet. (Tr. 47, 57, 83, 92, 148, 
238). 
At the time of the crash here involved, which was 
on January 14, 1949, plaintiff had in his employ, as an 
assistant, one Walter J. Mitchell. (Tr. 4, 109). The regu-
lar hours of operation of Wright's Garage were from 
9:00A.M. to 6:00P.M. (Tr. 4, 109). At the conclusion of 
the working day and shortly after 6 :00 P.M. on January 
14, 1949, the garage had been locked. (Tr. 5, 109). Mr. 
Wright then remembered that he had to obtain some 
parts for a truck he was working on. His car was locked 
in the garage and Mr. Mitchell offered to drive him to 
the parts store. (Tr. 110, 35). Mr. Mitchell in referring 
to the conversation between him and Mr. Wright at that 
time testified on cross-examination as follows: ('Tr. 35) 
''A. He asked me if I -or he says, 'I have 
got to go up to the parts house,' and he had his car 
in the garage, and I said, 'I will run you up.' 
Q. And you were going to bring him back7 
A. Yes.'' 
(See also Tr. 110). 
I~ 
!~) 
rna 
W), 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
:Jlr. :\Iitchell owns his own automobile which was a 
1938 Ford and which was a light gray or tan in color. 
(Tr. 6, -±-!, 101,111, 1-!9, 205). The car was parked in the 
drive"-ay leading to the 'Yright home. ~lr. :Mitchell testi-
fied that he backed his automobile out of the driveway 
onto Highway 91 and then pulled forward slightly so 
that he was facing to the southeast. (T'r. 10). Just how 
far the automobile was backed onto Highway 91 is a 
matter concerning which there is a sharp dispute in the 
evidence. This will be discussed later. When Mitchell 
got the car on the road the automobile flooded out or 
stalled. (Tr. 29, 37). At about the same time the lights 
on the :Mitchell automobile went out. (Tr. 37). Mr. 
Mitchell was not aware that the lights were out because 
a flood light of 300 candle power located on the corner 
of the garage flooded directly down on the driveway. 
(Tr. 37, 112, 113, 114). The plaintiff came from his house 
out to the road where the Mitchell car was stalled and 
told Mitchell to get the car off the road. ( Tr. 11, 126, 
136). Mr. :Mitchell testified that he realized the car was 
in a dangerous situation where it was stalled. (Tr. 39, 
40). 
The defendant Theron W. Maynard was driving his 
Dodge automobile in a northerly direction along Highway 
91 through the City of Orem and toward Salt Lake City. 
He had with him as passengers, his wife, Mr. and Mrs. 
Raymond Klauck, and Mr. and Mrs. M. W. Wiscomb. 
(Tr. 146, 147, 165, 232, 258, 274, 283, 293). Mr. Theron 
W. Maynard was driving; Mrs. Maynard, his wife, was 
in the center in the front seat, and Mr. M. W. Wiscomb 
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was on the right side in the front seat. In the back seat · 
Mr. Raymond Klauck was in the center, Mrs. M. W. 
Wiscomb was on the right and Mrs. Raymond Klauck 
was on the left of the rear seat. (Tr. 232). 
Defendant's wife, Mrs. T. W. Maynard, testified as 
follows: (Tr. 276) 
''A. As we were going on the outskirts of 
Orem, we were going along, and all at once a light 
colored car loomed right up square in front of us 
on our side of the highway.'' 
The defendant, Mr. Theron W. Maynard, testified 
that it was approximately 260 feet from the Wright 
Garage south to the curve in Highway 91. (Tr. 148). 
Mr. Maynard further testified: (Tr.173-174). 
'' Q. Now tell us when you first-that auto-
mobile came within your vision, with reference 
to the curve of that road, when you first saw that 
automobile, where your car was. 
A. I would estimate the distance at a hun-
dred feet. 
Q. You saw the automobile at a hundred 
feet1 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Is that a hundred 
feet from the curve or a hundred feet from the 
automobile 1 
A. A hundred feet from where I actually 
-where my lights actually revealed the automo-
bile, at the time my lights revealed it to me, and 
I was conscious of it actually being there, I would 
say I was a hundred feet from it. 
MR. McCULLOUGH: In other words, you 
were ·a hundred feet south of the automobile, the 
Ford automo'bile, we will call it the Mitchell auto-
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t• mobile, Ford :Jl itehell automobile, you were a 
li hundred feet south, traveling on the right hand 
~ side of the road 1 
A. Yes, sir.'' 
~~ :Mr. Raymond Klauck testified: (Tr. 303, 304). 
'· Q. So that your car when your car got 
~ around the turn, your lights picked this automo-
·li bile up that was stalled on your side of the road, 
[t about 300 feet to the north, is that correct' 
A. \V ell, approximately. 
Q. And that's your best judgment1 
~ A. Uh huh.'' 
il 
[!il 
an 
* * * * 
'' Q. So that your car then moved approxi-
mately 300 feet after you saw the lights light 
up this car, until the accident occurred' 'That is 
correct, isn't it1 
A. I would say maybe it would be about 
that.'' 
Mrs. M. W. Wiscomb testified: ( Tr. 286). 
'' Q. And as you went around the bend your 
lights-the lights of the car you were riding in, by 
the lights you saw this Ford stalled in the road 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. The car was stopped 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And there was a person on the south side 
of it, or the right hand side of it, or the south side 
of it as far as you are concerned, waiving his 
arms? 
A. Yes.'' 
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Mr. M. W. Wiscomb testified: (Tr. 238). 
"Q. Then you stated, Mr. Wiscomb, that 
there was a curve or a bend in the road? 
A. Uh huh. 
Q. Some distance south of the Wright 
Garage, is that correct? 
A. That's right. 
Q. I think you stated that it was about where 
the old road goes down to Geneva? 
A. The old Geneva resort, not the Geneva 
plant. 
Q. The Geneva resort? 
A. Yes, uh huh. 
Q. That would be about how far south, in 
feet, about how far south of the Wright Garage T 
A. Oh, possibly 300. 
Q. 300 feet. That's your best judgment? 
A. Uh huh. 
Q. And it is quite a-really isn't a curve, it 
is more of a bend? -
A. That's right, it is more of a bend in the 
road. 
Q. And you recall coming around that bend' 
A. Uh huh. 
Q. And when you got to that bend, as you 
came around, your lights showed up the Wright 
Garage, did they not? 
A. Showed up the automobile in the middle 
of the road. '' 
Mr. M. W. Wiscomh further testified: (Tr. 239, 240). 
'' Q. You were sitting on the right hand side 
of the front seat, were you not? 
A. That's right. 
Q. When you went around the turn, about 
three hundred feet south of the Ford automobile, 
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7 
your lights showed the Ford automobile out there 
in the road! 
A. ~raybe not just as we made the turn, 
but they did show it as we came upon it. 
Q. How far would you say you were when 
you first saw the Ford, as you went around this 
bend, how far south were you from the Ford? 
A. Oh, possibly 200, 250 feet, maybe-
Q. Between 200 and 250 feet' 
A. Possibly that far. 
Q. And did you see the party who was later 
referred to as ~Ir. 'y right out on the right hand 
side of the car, waiving his hands' 
A. That's right. There was no lights on 
the car, as apparently he was trying to show us.'' 
At the time the Mitchell automobile was first ob-
served plaintiff was wearing white coveralls. ( Tr. 91, 
142, 261, 287, 295). He was standing at the right, or south 
side, of the Mitchell automobile facing southerly, in the 
direction from which defendant's automobile was ap-
proaching, and waiving his arms. (Tr. 151, 176, 234,260, 
276, 284, 287, 291, 295). Defendant .applied his brakes but 
could not stop. Defendant Maynard testified as follows: 
(Tr. 153). 
"A. As I said, I played my brakes when it 
was obvious that if I held them intact I would 
slide directly broadside into the stalled automo-
bile. So I merely played them to pull myself to the 
right and avoid the accident.'' 
Mr. Maynard further testified: (Tr. 152) 
''A. I had to make a mental decision on what 
to do. There was traffic coming from the north. 
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I couldn't go to the left without crashing head-on. 
I had five passengers in my car to consider be-
sides the man standing at the side of the car. I 
applied the brakes and my car slid directly at the 
stalled car. And I felt that if I continued in that 
course I would pin that man between the two cars, 
between the front end of my car and the side of the 
stalled automobile. So I pulled my car to the 
right, and played my brakes, to give me some traC-
tion to get to the right of that stalled automobile, 
and my car took hold, and I went to the right.'' 
Mr. Raymond Klauck testified: (Tr. 304, 305, 307) 
'' Q. What was the next movement of the 
car~ 
A. Well, then I knew that he had applied his 
brakes, because he was saying, 'My God, I can't 
stop.''' 
• • • * 
"MR. McCULLOUGH: Q. After the brakes 
were applied and Mr. Maynard said, 'I can't stop 
on the ice,' then you saw the car-observed the 
car move over to the right~ 
A. Yes.'' 
• • • • 
'' Q. So th:,tt if the car hadn't turned to the 
right 20 feet before it got to the Ford it would 
have went right into the Ford~ 
A. That's right." 
Mr. M. W. Wiscomb testified: (Tr. 234). 
'' * * * Evidently he (plaintiff) was trying to 
get to the snowbank on the side of the road, to 
get out of the path of it (Maynard vehicle) be-
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cause had he have not let upon his brake, and the 
transmission took hold so that he could make a 
slight turn to get a way from this car, he would 
have hit head-on into the car and probably pushed 
him. And as we hit him, it picked him up and 
carried him on, and he fell off into the side as we 
hit the snowbank." · 
(Explanation added). 
:Mr. ~l. \V. Wiscomb further testified: (Tr. 243). 
'' Q. In other words, you could feel the 
brakes being applied 1 
A.. Yes, you could feel it take. 
Q. Then it started sliding1 
A. Uh huh. 
Q. Directly towards the Ford~ 
A. Right towards the Ford. 
Q. Then did you feel any other movement of 
the car~ 
A. Well, as I recall, as I previously stated, 
he let his foot off the brake pedal, thereby giving 
him a little additional purchase on the road, and 
that's what changed our direction. 
Q. In other words, you presumed that's what 
he did~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. In other words, you figured that he prob-
ably eased up on his brakes, because the car 
apparently started veering to the right~ 
A. That's right-no, no, it didn't start 
veering to the right, it started sliding directly 
into him.'' 
The plaintiff, Mr. Marion Wright, when he saw de-
fendant's car coming directly toward him and that the 
driver was not stopping, ran to the east to get off the 
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road and was struck by the defendant Mr. Maynard, as 
Mr. Maynard swung to the right. Mr. Wright testified: 
(Tr. 115, 116) 
'' Q. And as you stood there at the side of 
the Mitchell automobile, did you observe an auto-
roo bile which you later learned was driven by Mr. 
Maynard~ 
A. Well, the first thing that I observed was 
the side of that car lit up just like a house. 
Q. The side of which car~ 
A. The side of the car I was standing by, 
light up just as bright as could be. 
Q. What lit the side of the car~ 
A. The headlights of Mr. Maynard's car. 
Q. And which direction was that coming? 
A. That was coming from the south. 
Q. Will you describe what you observed 
frmn there on~ 
A. Well, I turned around, and waved my 
arms, or waved my hand; I don't know what I did. 
Q. You turned around. Which direction did 
you face? 
A. Turned around and faced the south. 
Q. Facing this on-coming automobile? 
A. Yes. And the first thing that entered 
my mind was that he was going to hit me against 
the side of this car. So I took off. That's all I 
remember. 
Q. Which way did you go~ 
A. Brother, I took off. I took off for the 
snowbank on the east side of the road, towards 
my house.'' 
The defendant's automobile ~arne to rest in a snow· 
bank a short distance past the point of impact. The 
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plaintiff was disroYered lying in the snowbank to the 
right of defendant ·s Yehicle with one foot under the right 
running board. (Tr. 30, 41, 60, 153, 15-!, 186, 263, 271, 
272 295). 
:Jlr. :Jlitchell testified: (Tr. 40) 
''A. When-oh I seen his lights. It was just 
a little ways from my car, yes. 
Q. How far away¥ 
A. I don't know for sure, because I just 
looked up and just a glare hit me right in the 
eye.'' 
The plaintiff, Mr. Wright, testified that the lights 
of defendant's automobile lit up the side of the Mitchell 
car from a distance of about 250 to 300 feet. (Tr. 133). 
Mr. Wright on cross-examination testified as follows: 
( Tr. 132-135). 
'' Q. I see. Now where was the Maynard 
vehicle when you first observed it¥ 
A. I'd say it was 50 to 60 feet from me, 
coming right along the snowbank. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Q: Coming right 
along the snowbank. That was the first time you 
saw it¥ 
A. I saw headlights wntil then, then all I saw 
was wheels splashing wate.r, and then I ran. 
Q. Where were the headlights when you first 
saw them? 
A. I can't tell you how far up the road, but 
they had the car lit up, so I imagine it would be 
250, 300 feet. I can't tell you. If they were on 
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high beam, they should be 300 feet, or 50, some-
thing like that. 
Q. But the car was lit up so 50 feet away 
you knew there was a car coming~ 
A. Well, I sure knew there was something 
coming that had lights on it. 
* * * * 
A. I turned around and done this to him. 
I don't know; it didn't take him long to travel 
250 feet, I will tell you that. 
Q. You were waiving your arms, weren't 
you~ 
A. I was waiving one arm or something. I 
can't tell you whether I was waiving one arm or 
both arms or what. 
* * * * 
Q. So that he must have traveled for at least 
300 feet along the shoulder of the road, that is, 
the unsurfaced portion~ 
A. I think so. 
Q. And seeing him come along in that 
fashion, you ran directly into his path~ 
A. I didn't see him coming; all I saw was 
lights ,coming, man, and they were coming. 
Q. And you ran directly into his path~ 
A. I ran off the road like any sane person 
would do.'' 
Trooper N eldon S. Evans of the State Highway 
Patrol, one of the investigating officers, testified there 
were some wheel tracks leading hack approximately from 
the front of the Maynard vehicle, hut not from the front 
wheels, about 52 feet to the rear. (Tr. 210). The right 
track was visible, however, the left track was only visi-
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ble in spots ; part of the time you could see it and part of 
the time you could not. (Tr. 212, 213). Trooper R'Obert 
G. Ingersoll of the Highway Patrol, the other investigat-
ing officer, testified to substantially the same thing. (Tr. 
255). 
As plaintiff was standing on the south side of the 
stalled Ford automobile, the side of it was lit up by the 
headlights of the defendant's car. (Tr. 115, 116). The 
events that took place at this time are cogently set forth 
in the testimony of the various witnesses both for plain-
tiff and defendant. 
:Mr. Mitchell testified on cross-examination as fol-
lows: (T'r. 39, 40). 
"Q. Now Mr. Wright came out to your car 
and did he come up by the right hand door~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he get in~ 
A. No. 
Q. What did he do~ 
A. I guess as soon as he got up there he seen 
that oar, and started waiving it down. 
* * * * 
Q. And then Mr. Wright ran to the front 'of 
your car, didn't he~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Right into the path of Mr. Maynard's 
automobile~ -
A. Yes. 
* * * * 
Q. Mr. Maynard's car didn't strike your car 
at all, did it~ 
A. No, not that I know of.'' 
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The plaintiff, Mr. Wright, testified on direct examin-
ation: (Tr. 116) 
"A. Well, the first thing that I observed 
was the side of that car lit up just like a house. 
* * * * 
Q. What lit the side of the car~ 
A. The headlights of ~1r. Maynard's car. 
* * * * 
A. Well, I turned around, and waived my 
arms, or waived my hand; I don't know what I 
did. 
Q. You turned around. Which direction did 
you face~ 
A. ·Turned around and faced the south. 
Q. Facing this on-coming automobile~ 
A. Yes. And the first thing that entered my 
mind was that he was going to hit me against the 
side of his car, so I took off. That's all I remem-
ber. 
Q. Which way did you go~ 
A. Brother I took off. I took off for the 
snowbank on the east side of the road, towards my 
house. 
Q. Did you observe where the Maynard car 
was traveling in relation to the concrete highway? 
A. It was clear off the highway the only 
time I saw it. 
Q. And that's off which direction~ 
A. That's off east of the highway." 
Mr. Wright, plaintiff, on cross-examination, further 
testified : ( Tr. 133, 135) 
'' Q. Where were the headlights when you 
first saw them? 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
A. I can't tell you how far up the road, but 
they had the car lit up, so I imagine it would be 
250, 300 feet. I can't tell you. If they were on 
high beam, they should be 300 feet, or 50, some-
thing like that. 
• * • • 
Q. And seeing him come along in that 
fashion, you ran directly into his path~ 
A. I didn't see him coming; all I saw was 
his lights coming, man, and they were coming. 
Q. And you ran directly into his path~ 
A. I ran off the road like any sane person 
would do. 
Q. Into his path~ 
A. I didn't run into his path, he run over my 
path. 
Q. Your paths intersected, didn't they~ 
A. They certainly did, and I got the blunt 
of it." 
Defendant Maynard testified on direct examination: 
(Tr. 152, 153). 
''A. I had to make a mental decision on what 
to do. There was traffice coming from the north. 
I couldn't go to the left without crashing head-
on. I had five rpassengers in my car to consider be-
sides the man standing at the side of the car. I 
applied my brakes and my car slid directly at the 
stalled car. And I felt that if I continued in that 
course, I would pin that man between the two cars, 
between the front end of my car and the side of 
the stalled automobile. So I pulled m·y car to the 
right, and played my brakes, to give me some 
traction to get to the right of that stalled automo-
bile, and my car took hold, and I went to the 
right. 
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Q. When you say your car took hold, what 
do you mean by that~ 
A. The steering apparatus took hold, and I 
veered to the right and avoided hitting the ,car 
broadside. 
Q. Now did anything else happen at that 
time~ 
A. At about-at the point I got almost to 
that automobile, I had pulled to the right, and was 
avoiding it, Mr. Wright broke from in front of 
it and jumped right in front of my automobile. 
Q. Did your automobile strike Mr. Wright¥ 
A. My automobile struck Mr. Wright. 
Q. Were you continuously applying your 
brakes during the time that this transpired~ 
A. As I said, I played my brakes when it was 
obvious that if I held them intact I would slide 
directly broadside into the stalled automobile. So 
I merely played them to pull myself to the right 
and avoid the accident." 
Mr. Maynard further testified on direct examina-
tion: 
"Q. * * * Did you see Mr. Wright when you 
hit him~ 
A. When he lunged in front of me, I defin-
itely hollered as loud as I could, 'No, No, No,' just 
before the point of impact. 
Q. How far were you away then, when you 
hollered, 'no, no, no~'' 
A. I was practically to the car, and he 
dashed in front of me, as I hollered it out. 
Q. In other words he ran toward the side 
of the road~ 
A. That's right, from his position." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
~Irs. ~\my Klauck testified on direct examination as 
follows: (Tr. 260, 261). 
''A. " ... ell, as we '"ere traveling north, we 
came around a Yery small bend in the road. It 
wasn't a sharp bend, but it was a curve in the 
road. And our headlights picked up a car that was 
stalled broadside this way. He was standing to 
the south of it waiving his arms and Mr. Maynard 
tried to turn* * * 
* * * * 
A. Tried to turn. There was on-coming 
traffic from the north, and had we turned in the 
usual left hand to pass, trying to get around that, 
we would have hit the on-coming traffic as he 
turned to the left. As we got to the car * * * 
Q. Just a moment. 
A. Or to the right, I beg your pardon. We 
turned to the right and as we got to the car, this 
man jumped in front of us.'' 
Mrs. Alta Maynard, wife of defendant, testified 
as follows: ( Tr. 276) 
"A. We didn't go to the left. There was 
traffic coming, so we turned to the right. And 
just as we got in-just before we went in front 
of the ,car, Mr. Wright jumped in front of us." 
Mr. M. W. Wiscomb testified on direct examina-
tion: (Tr. 233, 234) 
''A. And as he applied his brakes, he started 
to slide right towards the car. Then as he got a 
little closer, he let up on his brakes and that more 
or less had a tendancy to give him a little more 
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purchase on the road, as the ignition took hold, 
and he turned and passed this car on the east, 
just missing it, and at the same time there was 
a man in front of this car waiving his arms in 
this manner (indicating), attempting to have us 
see it, beoouse there was no lights on the car. 
And as he made this slight turn and went in front 
of this car, it creased his hind fender, just ticked 
it. And just before we passed this car, the man 
who was waiving his hands in front of there 
jumped, jumped right in front of us. Evidently 
he was trying to get to the snowbank on the side of 
the road, to get out of the path of it, because had 
he have not let up on his brake, and the trans-
mission took hold so that he could make a slight 
turn to get away from this car, he would have hit 
head-on into the car and probably pushed him. 
And as we hit him it picked him up and carried 
him on, and he fell off into the side as we hit the 
snowbank.'' 
Mrs. Dorothy Wiscomb testified on direct examina-
tion as follows : '( Tr. 284). 
''A. Well, there was a slight turn in the 
road where this haJppened and just as our lights 
caught the-coming around the bend, there was 
a car straight across the road, cross-ways and a 
man standing to the side of it. And when I first 
saw him, he was turned around and started waiv-
ing his hands at us to stop. And apparently Mr. 
Maynard tried to stop, but the road being slick, 
we were sliding right towards him. And just be-
fore we got to the car, he managed to turn out to 
the left into-or to the right, into the snowbank. 
And just at that time the man run from the car 
right in front of us." 
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Mr. Raymond Klauck testified on direct examina-
ation as follows: (Tr. 295 ). 
·'A. 'Vhat I saw happen, there was a car 
parked directly across the road, and a man stand-
ing in his white coveralls waiving his hands up 
and down. 'y e attempted to stop-I know the 
brakes were applied. That's only natural. You 
know that being in the car. 
Q. 'Yas there any change in the movement, 
or feeling in the automobile¥ 
A. Yes, naturally-well, we wasn't going 
at a very good rate of speed. The change would 
be slow on ice and all of a sudden the car just took 
over to one side. 
Q. And when did it take over to one side 1 
A. Oh, I would say approximately 10 or 15 
feet before we approached the front of the car, 
or maybe a little bit further. 
Q. I see. What else occurred at that time if 
anything? 
A. Well, the-Mr. Wright had jumped out 
in front of our car, and of course we caught him 
with the front of our bumper. 
• • • • 
Q. Then what happened? 
A. Well, then because the car was on the 
angle, we hit the snowbank and went into the 
snowbank.'' 
Mr. Raymond Klauck . testified further on cross-
examination: (Tr. 305, 306). 
'' Q. After the brakes were applied and Mr. 
Maynard said, 'I can't stop on the ice,' then you 
saw the car-observed the car move over to the 
right? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And how far did the car-how far was 
the car from the Ford when he turned to the right, 
as you stated~ 
A. Oh, I would say approximately 20, 25 
feet." 
Mr. Raymond Klauck who was sitting in the middle 
in the back seat testified that from his observations it 
was his opinion that the headlights of the defendant's 
automobile were on low beam. (Tr. 298). The defendant, 
Mr .. Maynard, testified that he did not know whether his 
lights were on high beam or low beam. (Tr. 148). Mr. 
M. W. Wiscomb who was sitting on the front seat on the 
right side testified that the lights were in good condi-
tion; that they showed the Ford automobile of Mr. 
Mitchell about 200 to 250 feet away. (Tr. 239). 
Passengers in the Maynard automobile estimated the 
speed from 20 to 25 miles per hour, with most of them fix-
ing the speed from 25 to 30 miles per hour. {Tr. 173, 249, 
259, 275, 284, 298). They estimated the speed at the time 
the Maynard car came into contact with the snowbank 
from 8 to 10 miles per hour. (Tr. 248, 249). No testi-
mony was offered by plaintiff or witnesses for plaintiff 
with respect to the speed in miles per hour of the May-
nard automobile. 
It is undisputed that the Maynard car came to rest 
in a snowbank in such fashion that the front and right 
side of the car were embedded in the snow. Witnesses 
on behalf of plaintiff testified that the car was completely 
into the snowbank except for the left rear wheel. (Tr. 
41, 55, 79, 96). Witnesses on behalf of defendant testified 
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that the left side of the car and rear wheels were entirely 
free of the sno'v bank. ( Tr. 153. 155, 208, 222). 
Byron Jensen testified that on June 8, 1949, he 
examined the lights of defendant's car for purposes of 
the state inspection law and found them to be in good 
order and in compliance with state requirements. (T~. 
25-1). ~\. foundation for his testimony was laid by testi-
mony of defendant that his lights had not been adjusted, 
replaced or repaired between January 14, and June 8, 
1949: (Tr. 163). 
With respect to the width of the road plaintiff and 
certain witnesses called on his behalf testified that the 
main portion of the road was 27 feet wide and an addi-
tional 4-ft. paved shoulder on each side. ( Tr. 107). Plain-
tiff and witnesses who testified on his behalf also testi-
fied that the shoulder of the road had been cleared to 
a distance of 12 to 15 feet east of the easterly edge of the 
paved portion of the highway. (Tr. SO, 93, 118). There 
is no dispute that there was a large snowbank running 
along the east edge of the road approximately 3 to 31f2 
feet high and some distance east of the east edge of the 
paved portion of the road. 
Officers Evans and Ingersoll, members of the State 
Highway Patrol, who had investigated the accident, were 
called and testified on the part of the defendant. They 
stated that by ta:pe measurement the width of the paved 
portion of the road was 27 feet. (Tr. 207, 210, 214, 215, 
219, 223). They estimated that the distance at the side 
of the road cleared of snow at 10 or 12 feet. (Tr. 210, 
215,216,218, 224). Klauck estimated the cleared distance 
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at 7 to 8 feet. (Tr. 305). Defendant Maynard testified 
that the snow had beew cle1ared ''beyond the pa;ved edge 
of the highw1ay no more th~ 2 or 3 feet." (Tr. 151). 
There is also a sharp dispute in the evidence as to 
the condition of the road at the time of the accident. Wit-
nesses called on behalf of plaintiff testified that the 
highway was either dry, or damp, or wet. They testi-
fied that generally there was no ~ce on Highway 91 ex-
cept in spots, and a strip down the center where the 
cars had not cut in, and that generally the paved portion 
of the road was free of hard packed snow. Mr. Wright 
testified that there had been some thawing and that there 
was slush at the sides of the road. (Tr. 33, 47, 60, 65, 67, 
72, 98, 117, 135). Occupants of the Maynard vehicle and 
the patrolmen who investigated the accident testified that 
the roads were entirely cover·ed with a sheet of glare ice 
and that they were extremely slick and slippery. (Tr. 
147, 167, 209, 219, 222, 223, 224, 227, 229 232, 237, 259, 
260, 265, 275,280 283,284,285,293,300, 301). 
There is a dispute in the evidence as to how far the 
Mitchell vehicle extended onto Highway 91 from the 
driveway leading into the plaintiff's home. Witnesses 
for plaintiff testified that the Mitchell car was some-
where near the east edge of the paved portion of the road. 
Mitchell testified that the rear wheels were just over 
the east edge of the paved portion of the highway. ('Tr. 
10, 38). Plaintiff testified that the rear bum'P'er of the 
Mitchell car was about even with the west edge of the east 
4-ft. paved shoulder of Highway 91. (Tr. 10, 38, 45, 90, 
114, 115). 
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~Ir. Robert 'y right testified that on the evening 
of the crash he passed the 'V right Garage while driving 
his car north and ::;a"T :Jfr. \Vright standing on the south 
side of the Ford :Jiitchell automobile. The Ford automo-
bile was out on Highway 91 facing to the south at about 
a -±5° angle. In passing to the rear of the Ford Mitchell 
automobile it was not necessary for him to swing to the 
left, but he passed the Ford by driving in his own right 
hand lane. ( Tr. 90, 91). 
:Jir. Lee Schoen testified that on the evening of the 
crash he passed the Wright Garage while driving High-
way 91 going north to American Fork to attend a basket-
ball game. :Mr. Schoell passed the Ford Mitchell automo-
bile which was headed in an angle to the south. He also 
noticed another car in the snowbank O'pposite the high-
way and north of the Ford Mitchell automobile. In driv-
ing past the rear of the Ford Mitchell automobile he 
remained in his own lane of traffi.c. He testified that 
the only difficulty was that he, ''had to slow down a little 
bit in order to do it, as you will, if you approach a car 
that is on the edge of the highway." (Tr. 44, 45, 46). 
Mr. :l\lerle Paulk testified that after the Maynard 
vehicle had crashed off the road into the snowbank, that 
he passed Mr. Mitchell's Ford automobile, which was pro-
truding onto Highway 91, by driving on his ·own side of 
the paved portion of the road. It was not necessary that 
he drive out around to the left in order to pass the 
Mitchell automobile. (Tr. 71). 
Occupants of the Maynard automobile, testified that 
the Mitchell automobile was squarely astride the right 
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hand or northbound driving lane of Highway 91, com-
pletely blocking passage of northbound traffic. (Tr. 150, 
233, 260, 283, 295). 
It was stipulated by counsel for plaintiff and defend-
ant that the length of the Mitchell automobile was ap-
proximately 15 feet. (Tr. 131). The Maynard auto-
mobile passed between the front end of the Mitchell 
automobile and the snowbank directly to the east of High-
way 91. The left rear fender of the Maynard automobile 
scraped against the bumper of the Mitchell automobile 
in passing in front of it, otherwise there was no con-
tract between the two vehicles. (Tr. 41, 131-132). 
There is conflict in the evidence as to whether there 
was on-coming traffic from the north at the time the 
collision occurred. Plaintiff and Mr. Mitchell testified 
they looked to the north immediately prior to the acci-
dent and there was no traffic approaching from the north 
at that time. ( Tr. 32, 115, 135). Mr. Merle Paulk testi-
fied that he pulled onto the highway south of the Wright 
Garage and followed behind the Maynard automobile 
until it crashed off the highway into the snowbank, and 
that there was no traffic approaching from the north at 
the time of the accident. (Tr. 69). Defendant and several 
passengers in his car testified there was oncoming traffic 
from the north making it impossible for them to pass to 
the left of the Mitchell automobile without crashing into 
the southbound traffic. (Tr. 149, 162, 261, 275, 294, 298). 
Defendant testified that plaintiff stated to him that 
he, the plaintiff, did not hold him, the defendant, in any 
way responsible for the accident. Mr. Reese James Wil-
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liams, who was a patient in the same room in the hospital 
as the plaintiff, testified to a similar statement made by 
the plaintiff. (Tr. 161, 201, 202). This testimony was de-
ned by plaintiff (Tr. 328). ~Ir. Reese James Williams 
also testified that he was an intimate acquaintance of 
~Ir. ~Iaynard and had known him for about 14 years and 
was frequently in :.Mr. Maynard's home. (Tr. 202, 203). 
At the conclusion of the trial, both parties made 
motions for directed verdicts. ( Tr. 335, 336, 337). The 
motion of the defendant was denied. After argument, the 
motion of the plaintiff was granted. The jury r·eturned a 
verdict, in favor of the plaintiff, in the sum of $1,004.44 
(R. 44). The jury allowed plaintiff $480.00 for general 
damages. The items of special damages claimed by plain-
tiff were cut in half by the jury although there was no 
dispute in the evidence as to most of the items of special 
damages claimed by plaintiff. (R. 44). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. 
DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
A. THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHES 
THAT DEFENDANT COULD NOT STOP HIS AUTOMOBILE 
WITHIN THE RANGE OF HIS VISION, i.e., THE DISTANCE 
ILLUMINATED BY HIS HEADLIGHTS. 
B. THE "ASSURED CLEAR DISTANCE RULE" AS 
EXPRESSED IN DALLEY VS. MIDWESTERN DAIRY PRO-
DUCTS CO. (80 Utah 331, 15 P. 2d 309 [1932] ) AND IN THE 
CASES DECIDED BY THIS COURT SUBSEQUENT TO THE 
DALLEY CASE, IS THE LAW OF THIS STATE. 
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C. THE RULE OF LAW AS LAID DOWN IN THE DAL-
LEY CASE, AND THE CASES DECIDED SUBSEQUENT 
THERETO, IS APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS 
CASE. 
II. 
DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES. 
III. 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLI-
GENT. 
IV. 
THE JURY COULD NOT HAVE FOUND THIS TO BE 
AN UNA VOIDABLE ACCIDENT, THEREFORE, N 0 T 
CHARGEABLE TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF EITHER PARTY 
TO THE ACTION. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
A. THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY ESTABUSHES 
THAT DEFENDANT COULD NOT STOP HIS AUTOMOBILE 
WITHIN THE RANGE OF HIS VISION, i.e., THE DISTANCE 
ILLUMINATED BY HIS HEADLIGHTS. 
The lower court held that defendant, because he did 
not have his car under control, so as to be able to stop it 
within the range of his vision, i.e., the distance illumi-
nated by his headlights, was guilty of negligence as a 
Inatter of law. The court's finding is supported by the 
testimony of defendant himself and defendant's wit-
nesses, who were riding in the car with defendant. 
Defendant's statement (P. 17, 18 of defendant's 
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brief), ''It is clear fron1 the testimony of the defendant 
and the passengers in his car, that no all out effort was 
made by the defendant to bring his car to a complete 
stop,·' is erroneous. Defendant makes no reference to the 
record to support such a statement. 
Plaintiff has set forth in some detail the testi1nony 
of defendant and defendant's witnesses regarding this 
point in his statement of fact (see pages 7, 8, 9), 
therefore, only short excerpts of testimony are inserted 
here. 
Mr. ~Iay""Dard: (Tr. 153, 152). 
"* * * I played my brakes when it was ob-
vious that if I held them intact I would slide di-
rectly broadside into the stalled automobile * * *'' 
'' * * * I applied my brakes and my car slid 
directly at the stalled car, and I felt that if I 
continued in that course I would pin that man be-
tween th two cars, between the front end of nry 
car and the side of the stalled automobile * • *" 
Mr. Raymond Klauck: ·(Tr. 304, 305, 307) 
''Well, then I knew he had applied his brakes, 
because he was saying, 'My God, I can't stop.'" 
Mr. Wiscomb: (Tr. 234) 
'' * * * Evidently he (plaintiff) was trying to 
get to the snowbank on the side of the road, to 
get out of the 11ath of it (defendant's car), be-
cause had he have not let up on his brakes, and the 
transmission took hold so that he could make a 
slight turn to get away from this car, he would 
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have hit head on into the car and probably pushed 
him * * * '' (explanation added). 
The testimony is conclusive that defendant could 
not stop his car within the range of his vision, i.e., the 
distance illuminated by his headlights. 
B. THE "ASSURED CLEAR DISTANCE RULE" AS 
EXPRESSED IN DALLEY VS. MIDWESTERN DAIRY PRO-
DUCTS CO. (80 Utah 331, 15 P. 2d 309 [1932] ) AND IN THE 
CASES DECIDED BY THIS COURT SUBSEQUENT TO THE 
DALLEY CASE, IS THE LAW OF THIS STATE. 
This court in the Dalley case set down the following 
rule of law: (P. 310 P. 2d) 
''In this jurisdiction the doctrine is estab-
lished,' that it is negligence as a matter of law for 
a person to drive an automobile upon a traveled 
public highway, used by vehicles and pedestrians, 
at such a rate of speed that said automobile cannot 
be stopped within the distance at which the oper-
ator of said car is able to see objects upon the 
highway in front of him.' " 
This court in subsequent cases, which plaintiff will 
discuss, has clarified this rule to conform to emergency 
conditions, sudden changes in circumstances, etc., but it 
has not abrogated this rule. 
In HANSEN V. CLYDE, et al, 89 Utah 31, 56 P. 2d 
1366 (1936), a similar rule of law was laid down by this 
court: (P. 37 [Utah] ) 
'' * * * When a driver upon a public highway 
with his light equipment cannot see more than 50 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
feet ahead of him. it is his duty to stop within that 
distance • • • ·· 
Defendant seems to take great comfort in the dis-
senting opinion of ~Ir. Justice "\Volfe in the Clyde case 
(P. 39 Utah). Defendant cites the ninth example given 
by ~Ir. Justice "\Y olfe in his dissent to sustain his posi-
tion that defendant was not negligent and that the so-
called ·'assured clear distance rule'' is no longer the law 
of this state. Plaintiff is unable to understand defend-
ant's conjurations at this point. 
~Ir. Justice "\Volfe concedes that the law of this state 
is as set forth in the Dalley case. The examples he cites 
in his dissent deal with the question of causation, remote-
ness and intervening causes. Mr. Justice Wolfe states 
(P. 42 Utah): 
'' * * * Be that as it may, at this juncture the 
state of the law in this jurisdiction is that Bosone 
was negligent. The logic of the rule is that he 
must be able to stop within the distance he can see 
objects on the road; not out in the field * * * '' 
(P. 43 Utah): 
''We next come to the difficult question as 
to whether the negligence concurred to contribute 
to the accident* * * The decisions use such terms 
as 'too remote,' 'proximate,' 'immediate,' effi-
cient' and 'concurrent' causes, * * * " 
In the case of NIELSEN V. W AT AN ABE, 90 Utah 
401, 62 P. 2d 117, immediately prior to the accident the 
brilliant lights from a car coming from the opposite di-
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rection completely blinded and destroyed the vision of 
the driver and there was an instant period of darkness 
which rendered it impossible for him to see any object 
upon the highway and that during that instant the acci-
dent occurred. 
The court stated at page 119 (P. 2d): 
''If the truck could not, because of some ob-
struction, be seen as plaintiff and her husband ap-
proached it prior to the time they were blinded, 
and if pZaintiff's husba;nd, was driving at a lawfUl 
rate ~of speed an automobile properly equipped 
with lights a;nd b11akes a;nd without any reason to 
believe the headlights of another automobile would 
suddenly or wnexpectedly blind him, that while so 
blinded, the collision occurred without time for him 
to reduce his speed orr stop his automobile, the 
rule anwownced m the 10ases relied upon by defend-
ant amd heretofore cited in this opinion would not 
apply." (Referring to Dalley case, etc.). 
The logic of the rule necessarily implies that sudden 
changes, emergencies, etc., which could not be foreseen 
would limit the use of the rule. The court is merely stat-
ing something which is necessarily implied. 
In the case of MOSS V. CHRISTENSEN-GARD-
NER, INC., 98 Utah 253, 98 P. 2d 363 (1940), the same 
question was presented as in the Watanabe case hereto-
fore discussed. In this case plaintiff had reduced his 
speed because of an accumulation of smoke and mist in 
the vicinity, suddenly the glare of the headlights of an 
approaching vehicle impaired his visibilty until it was im-
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possible for him to see an unlighted and unmarked barri-
cade. The court stated. (P. 364, P 2d) 
· • However a case recently de,cided by this 
court, Nielsen v. 'y atanabe, • • • is, in our opinion, 
conclusive of the question here presented.'' 
The court in clarifying the application of the rule 
is merely reiterating what is already necessarily im-
plied that unforeseeable changes, emergencies, condi-
tions, constitute a legal excuse for not being able to stop 
within the driver's vision or lights. Mr. Justice Wolfe 
in concurring expresses the same idea. 
Defendant cites a portion of the dissenting opinion 
of Mr. Justice Larsen wherein he states (p. 367, P 2d): 
''I think the Dalley case should be overruled, 
or the doctrine thereof modified so as to make 
possible a realistic approach to the problem.'' 
I think all that need be said here is that the ru1e has 
already been modified or clarified and that this clarifi-
cation or "modification" to render the rule applicable 
to modern-day traffic does not involve '' sut>er refine-
ments in reasoning and hair-splitting in logic.'' 
In the case of TRIMBLE, et ux, V. UNION P ACI-
FIC STAGES, et al, 105 Utah 457, 142 P. 2d 674 (1943), 
this court followed the same rules that it laid down in 
the cases of Nielsen v. Watanabe (cited supra), Moss 
v. Christensen-Gardner, Inc. (cited supra). The court 
stated at page 676 (P. 2d): 
"Appellant argues that since defendant's bus 
was moving at such a speed after entering the fog 
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that it could not be stopped within the driver's 
range of vision the driver and principals, the 
defendants, were guilty of negligence as a matter 
of law. Thus in effect the appellants ask this court 
to say that 'One driving on a highway at night is 
bound to anticipate that there will be fog, smoke, 
or some other obstruction which will reduce the 
driver's vision, and that therefore all must drive 
at such speed that should they meet with such an 
obstacle they can stop their automobile within the 
range of their vision as it is limited by this ob-
struction. We do not believe this to be the correct 
rule of law, or the situation to which the rule laid 
down in the Dalley case, supra, was intended to 
apply. In Nielsen v. Watanabe, 90 Utah 401, 62 
P. 2d 117, 119, there was a situation similar to the 
one in this case* * *'' 
In HORSLEY V. ROBINSON, 112 Utah 227, 186 
P. 2d 592 ·( 1947), this court had before it the question 
of the duty a driver of a passenger vehicle owes to his 
passengers. Justice Wade in the course of his opinion 
stated (p. 597 [P. 2d] ) : 
''In Nikoleropoulos v. Ramsey, 61 Utah 465, 
214 P. 304, the defendant was driving his car at 
night during a heavy rain storm at about 12 miles 
per hour; in the distance the lights of oncoming 
cars reflected on the wet pavement into his eyes 
so that at the time of the accident he was unable 
to see the plaintiff walking on the pavement in 
front of him until he was within 6 feet and then it 
was too late to avoid running him down. We held 
that defendant was negligent as a matter of law, 
no matter how dark and stormy the night or how 
bad the visibility, if he drove at such a rate of 
speed that he was unable to avoid running plain-
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tiff down within the distance plaintiff rould be 
seen walking ahead of defendant's car on the 
highway. To the san1e effect see: Dalley v. Mid-
western Dairy Products Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P. 
2d 309: Haarstrich v. Oregon Short Line RR Co., 
70 Utah 332, 2G2 P. 100; O'Brien v. Alston, 61 
Utah ~iliS, 213 P. 791. 
"The Xikoleropoulos v. Ramsey case is in 
substance a holding that it is negligence to operate 
a vehicle on the highway at any time without 
having it under sufficient control so that others 
using the highway will not be unreasonably en-
dangered thereby, regardless of how slow it is re-
quired to travel to accomplish that end. If that 
is the rule where visibility is involved, it follows 
that the same rule applies where the lack of con-
trol which endangers others is the result of slip-
pery roads and stormy conditions * * * '' 
In the case of HICKMAN Y. UNION PACIFIC 
RR CO., ------ Utah ______ , 213 P. 2d 650 (Jan. 1950), this 
court had before it the question of the use of this rule 
in an instruction by the lower court to the jury. The 
lower court instructed: 
"* * • You are instructed that when a rail-
road company is using its right-of-way in a careful 
and lawful manner, the employees in charge of its 
trains have a right to presume that motorists 
approaching on streets or highways which cross 
the railroad track will proceed carefully and law-
fully, and the railroad company's employees have 
a right to presume that motorists on the highway 
will drive with their cars under such control as 
to be able to stop within the di::;tance at which they 
can see objects ahead." 
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This court there held that where the driver's view was 
unobstructed ahead and on either side and nothing to 
impair his vision, that the rule was clearly applicable. 
Mr. Justice Wolfe ~oncurring in the result pays 
particular attention to the use of this rule. He states: 
'' * * * So it comes down to this, that in any 
case unless a moving object has come onto the 
roadway at such a distance before an a;prproach-
ing automobile so as to be illuminated by the 
lights of the said automobile when by their power 
they would first .catch a stationary ·object, in-
structions as to the speed-light range relationship 
are not applicable but confusing. Put in another 
way, where a moving object intrudes itself into 
the cone of light made by the lights of an auto-
mobile at a point nearer to the car than the total 
distance in which its lights will first reveal ob-
jects, instructions as to the speed-light range re-
lationship are not applicable.'' 
It is interesting to note the statement of the Utah 
rule as expressed by the United States Court of Appeals, 
Tenth Circuit, MARAGAKIS V. UNITED STATES, 
172 F. 2d 393, 394 (1949). Judge Murrah states: 
"The later Utah cases have rationalized the 
rule to allow an area of discretion under condi-
tions 'suddenly and unexpectedly' arising within 
the clear vision ahead, which with the exercise 
of due care the driver could not have avoided the 
collision * * * '' 
See also the case of GATTON V. F. J. EGNER & 
SON INC. 73 NE 2d 812 (Dec. 1946) where the Ohio 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
35 
Court of ~'-ppeals had before it a case involving the 
"assured clear distance ahead" statute which has been 
enacted in Ohio as well as a nmnber of other states. The 
Ohio court unhesitatingly cites the Dalley case (cited 
supra) as authority for the rule. 
Defendant, by the statements made in his brief 
would have us believe that the ''assured clear distance 
ahead" rule, or by whatever name it may be called, is 
a disreputable rule and has been rejected by most of ''our 
sister states.'' Defendant from page 32 through page 44 
of his brief cites and quotes from a ''basketful!'' of 
cases which he contends uphold his statements. The rule 
as relied upon by plaintiff has been discussed and de-
bated before this Utah court on numerous occasions. It 
can serve no purpose to rehash an argument which has 
already been determined. Of the cases cited by defend-
ant, many compare with decisions of this court in Nielsen 
v. Watanabe (cited supra); Moss v. Christensen-Gardner, 
Inc., (cited supra) ; and Trimble v. Union Pacific Stages 
(cited supra). 
Defendant cites and quotes at page 35 of his brief 
the California case of Sawdey v. Rasmussen, 290 P. 684, 
to sustain his position that California has rejected the 
rule. Defendant should look to the later California case 
of JONES V. HEDGES, 123 Cal. App. 742, 12 P. 2d 
111, 115, which impliedly accepts the rule. 
C. THE RULE OF LAW AS LAID DOWN IN THE DAL-
LEY CASE, AND THE CASES DECIDED SUBSEQUENT 
THERETO, IS APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS 
CASE. 
Defendant testified that it was approximately 260 
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feet from the Wright Garage south to the curv.e in High-
way 91. (Tr. 148). Defendant stated that his headlights 
revealed the stalled Ford Mitchell automobile to him 
when he was 100 feet from it. (Tr. 173-174). At the time 
the stalled Ford :Mitchell automobile was first observed, 
plaintiff was standing on the south side of the Ford waiv-
ing his arms. (Tr. 91, 142, 176, 261, 287, 295, 151, 234, 
260, 276, 284). Defendant and witnesses called on his be-
half testified that the defendant could not stop the car. 
(Tr. 152, 153, 304, 305, 307, 234, 243). (See also pages 
7, 8, 9 of plaintiff's brief). 
The essence of defendant's own testimony and nf the 
witnesses who testified on his behalf is that defendant did 
not have his ,car under control and could not stop it with-
in the range of his vision, i.e., the distance illuminated 
by his headlights. At the time the crash occurred it was 
night time, howev-er there was no fog. (Tr. 32, 58, 73, 79, 
147) no low hanging clouds, no rain or snow. (Tr. 48). 
The view from the curve in Highway 91 north to where 
the stalled Ford was situated was unobstructed. (Tr. 48, 
59). The lights on defendant's automobile picked up the 
stalled Ford automobile either as the car approached 
within the distance illuminated by them, or as the car 
rounded the curve they swept into view the Ford automo-
bile. (T'r. 148, 173-174, 303, 304, 386, 238, 239, 240). (See 
also pages 4, 5, 6, 7 of plaintiff's brief). 
The facts of this case are squarely within the rule 
and defendant was negligent as a matter of law. 
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II. 
DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES. 
III. 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLI-
GENT. 
IV. 
THE JURY COULD NOT HAVE FOUND THIS TO BE 
AN UNA VOIDABLE ACCIDENT, THEREFORE, N 0 T 
CHARGEABLE TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF EITHER PARTY 
TO THE ACTION. 
(Points II, III, and IV will be argued together). 
Defendant rounded the curve in Highway 91 and 
proceeded down the road. Defendant did not have his car 
under control as by his own admission he could not stop 
within the distance illuminated by his headlights as the 
lights picked up the stalled Ford automobile and the 
plaintiff. ( Tr. 153, 152, 304, 305, 307, 234, 243). 
The plaintiff upon seeing the lights of defendant's 
automobile approximately 250-300 feet away began waiv-
ing his arms. (Tr. 132-135). When it was obvious that 
if he, plaintiff, remained where he was standing he would 
be crushed between the two cars he acted as any reason-
ably prudent man would ~ct and ran for the side of the 
road to the east. (Tr. 116, 152, 153, 185). 
Defendant Maynard testified (Tr. 153, 155): 
'' Q. When you say your car took hold, what 
do you mean by that~ 
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A. The steering ~appartatus took hold, and I 
veered to the right and avoided hitting the car 
broadside.'' 
Mr. Wiscomb stated (Tr. 233, 234) : 
''"" • "" Evidently he (!plaintiff) was trying 
to get to the snowbank on the side of the road, to 
get out of the path of it (Maynard vehicle), be-
cause had he not have let up on on his brak,e, and 
the transmission took hold so that he could make 
a slight turn to get away from this car, he would 
have hit head-on into the car and probably pushed 
him. And as we hit him it picked him up and car-
ried him on and he fell off into the side as we hit 
the snowbank.'' 
Mrs. Wiscomb ~estified (Tr. 284): 
''And just before we got to the car he man-
aged to turn out to the left into-or to the right, 
into the snowbarnk. '' 
Mr. Klauck stated (Tr. 295): 
''A. Yes, naturally-Well, we wasn't going 
at a very good rate of speed. The change would be 
slow on ice ·and all of ,a sudden the oar just t·ook 
over to the right. 
Q. And when did it take over to the right~ 
A. Oh, I would say approximately 10 or 15 
feet before we approached the front of the car, or 
maybe a little bit further.'' 
Plaintiff acted as a reasonably prudent man would 
act, faced with the same situation. Defendant sliding and 
skiding toward plaintiff, about to crush him between two 
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cars, must foresee and expect that his intended victim 
will attempt to get out of the way, and the only logical 
and reasonable place for him to go is off the road. The 
plaintiff did not suddenly jun1p under defendant's ve-
hicle. Defendant saw plaintiff and the stalled Ford 
when he was 100 feet away and traveling 30 m.p.h. (Tr. 
173, 176). 
:Jir. Raymond Klauck, who was riding in the middle 
of the rear seat of the :Maynard vehicle saw the stalled 
Ford when they were 300 feet from it (Tr. 3_Q3). 
:Jir. :JI. W. Wiscomb, who was riding on the right 
hand side of the Maynard vehicle saw the stalled Ford 
and plaintiff waiving his arms when they were 200 to 250 
feet away. (Tr. 239, 240). 
Defendant, from his unsupported statements, would 
have us believe that defendant casually drove his car to 
the right with the situation entirely under control and 
without the slightest degree of danger to anyone. It is 
evident that defendant has no faith in his argument for 
he makes no reference to his "undisputed" testimony 
to support it. 
CONCLUSION 
Judgment for plaintiff should be affirmed. 
Resp~tfully submitted, 
McCULLOUGH, BOYCE & 
McCULLOUGH, 
Attorneys for Plaimtiff 
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